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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
: Case No. 20060972-CA 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, 
v. 
SUSAN TRIPP, (not incarcerated) 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER SUPPRESSION OF THE BLOOD 
TEST RESULTS. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF FACT ARE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
The State does not contest the clearly erroneous nature of the trial court's findings 
of fact 8 and 15, and the findings of fact encompassed in the trial court's conclusions of 
law. Compare Tripp's opening brief at 8-13 with State's brief at 12 n.3 (acknowledging 
Tripp's challenges and indicating it will address them in its discussion of the blood draw) 
and passim (failing to identify any evidence which supports the findings). Because the 
State has not met its burden, the Court should accept Tripp's argument as undisputed and 
correct. See, ej*., Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Management. 2005 UT App 430, f 20, 124 
P.3d 269 (when an appellant claims that findings are unsupported by any evidence, this 
casts upon the State the burden to show one scintilla of evidence in support of such 
findings). 
B. TRIPP DID NOT CONSENT TO THE BLOOD DRAW. 
The State argues that the police did not demand Tripp's submission to a blood test, 
and did not threaten to get a warrant if she did not submit to the blood test. State's brief 
at 15-16. Regardless if they expressly conditioned their performance on Tripp's refusal, 
the record confirms the police told Tripp that they would get a warrant and force the 
blood draw (R. 533: 28). The State's own brief recognizes these facts, see State's brief at 
15, which preclude a finding of lawful consent. See Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 497 
(1983)(plurality)(r,[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the 
burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and 
voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim 
of lawful authority."); Bumper v. North Carolina. 391 U.S. 543 (1968)("Where there is 
coercion there cannot be consent."); State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106-107 (Utah 
1980), supra. Cf. State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah 1986) (contrasting Bumper and 
stating, "Nor was defendant's consent mere acquiescence to perceived police authority."). 
The State argues that Tripp overcame her fear of needles before the blood draw 
and that her extending her arm to the blood tech is accurately interpreted as consent to the 
blood draw. State's brief at 17-18. However, the State's brief then acknowledges what 
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the record indisputably shows - that Tripp's extending her arm was in response to the 
blood tech's telling her he was just going to put a tourniquet on her arm to see if there 
was an easy site to do the blood draw. State's brief at 17. In arguing that there was no 
trickery, the State's brief fails to note the blood tech's opinion that when Tripp extended 
her arm for the tourniquet check, she did not know that he had his other equipment ready 
to draw her blood (R. 533: 95). See State's brief at 18. The State argues that after Davis 
found the site, he told Tripp he found an easy site and that they could go ahead and take 
care of it, and Tripp did not protest or pull her arm away, thus effectively consenting to 
the blood tech's "step by step" approach. See-State's brief at 18. The State's description 
of events omits two key factual elements. First, during the blood draw, Tripp was 
described as terrified, petrified, crying, and panicked (R. 533: 67, 71, 95). Finally, Tripp 
was pulling away and crying as they secured her in the police car by having the victim's 
advocate hold one hand, by having the blood tech holding her other hand behind her back, 
and by having a police officer standing over her covering her eyes (R. 533: 67, R. 525: 
270-71). 
The State's subsequent arguments that Tripp's pulling away was likely just her 
body pulling away because of her fear of needles acknowledges her continuing fear. 
State's brief at 20. The State's suggestion that Tripp's pulling away was the likely result 
of her "turning her eyes from the needle" overlooks the facts that the blood tech was 
holding the arm he was drawing the blood from behind Tripp's back and that the police 
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officer was shielding her eyes. State's brief at 20. While the State would have this Court 
believe that the State's actors were not restraining Tripp, but were trying to calm her, does 
not square with the reality that they were trying to calm her fears about having her blood 
taken forcibly by needle, in violation of her right to refuse consent. See, e.g.. United 
States v. Fernandez. 18 F.3d 874, 882 (10th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that right). The 
blood tech's paraphrasing that right to her as she was being restrained and tricked into the 
blood draw under threat of force and a warrant, as she cried and pulled away after having 
repeatedly refused, did nothing to make the blood draw a voluntary choice of Tripp's. 
But see State's brief at 20. 
This Court should take a moment to envision the sequence of events preceding and 
including the blood draw as clearly reflected in the record.1 The Court should then 
!The police isolated her from her friends and family, informed her she was in 
custody, and demanded that she submit to the blood test, telling her that they would get a 
warrant and take her blood by force if she did not submit (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 
71-72). During the blood draw, Tripp was in a police car, with an officer outside the car 
door and covering Tripp's eyes, a victim's advocate kneeling in front of her holding one 
of her hands, and the blood tech right outside the car door holding her other arm behind 
her (R. 533: 67, R. 525: 270). While she did extend her arm to the blood tech prior to the 
test, this was in response to his telling her that he was going to put the tourniquet on and 
see if there was a spot where it would be easy to draw blood (R. 533: 95). The blood tech 
felt at that time that Tripp did not know that he had his other equipment ready to draw her 
blood when she extended her arm (R. 533: 95). He testified that once he found a spot to 
draw the blood, he told her he had found an easy site and told her "we can just go ahead 
and take care of this," and as the victim advocate continued reassuring Tripp, he stuck the 
needle in (R. 533: 95). During the blood draw, Tripp was described as terrified, 
petrified, crying, and panicked (R. 533: 67, 71, 95). She was pulling away and crying as 
they secured her (R. 533: 67, R. 525: 271). Assuming arguendo that the Government 
could prove that Tripp's consent was voluntary, the consent was temporally proximate to 
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consider whether the State has met its burden to prove voluntary consent, in light of these 
factors: whether multiple officers were involved; 
the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; ...the absence 
of an exhibition of force by the officers;... a mere request to search; ... 
cooperation by [Tripp]; and ... the absence of deception or trick on the part 
of the officer. 
State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). 
C. TRIPP WAS UNLAWFULLY ARRESTED 
WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE. 
The State argues that Tripp's purported consent was not tainted by a preceding 
illegality, because the police had probable cause to arrest her for negligent homicide. 
State's brief at 20. The State's argument overlooks the salient facts that the police 
arrested Tripp only after she adamantly refused to submit to a blood draw (R. 533: 16, 31-
32), that they did this while acting under the incorrect beliefs that blood draws are 
routinely taken in serious accidents and that the police had the legal right to demand a 
blood sample from Tripp as a result of the implied consent statute (R. 532: 23, 533: 10, 
and part of her illegal arrest and continuing detention. The only arguably attenuating 
factor was the blood tech's reviewing the DUI admonition, and mentioning Tripp's rights 
to silence, counsel and to refuse the test (R. 533: 102). This discussion, coming from the 
blood tech, undoubtedly rang rather hollow to Tripp, given that the discussion occurred 
after the police informed Tripp that she was in custody, not free to leave, and under arrest 
(R. 532: 27; R. 533: 16, 31-32, 73). Further, the discussion followed the police demand 
that she take the test, while telling her that she could not refuse to submit to the blood 
draw, and that the police would get a warrant and take her blood by force if she did not 
comply (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72). 
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25, 33-34). 
In support of the negligent homicide argument, the State argues as if Tripp failed 
to yield the right of way by hitting Pracht's motorcycle as he was driving through the 
intersection. State's brief at 21-22. The evidence at trial actually demonstrated that as 
Tripp's car was passing through the intersection, Pracht's motorcycle slid underneath and 
into the rear end of her truck (R. 525: 346). In arguing that the police had probable cause 
that Tripp committed negligent homicide, the State never acknowledges the police 
testimony that they did not know if Pracht caused the accident. At the time of the arrest 
and blood draw, the police did not know if Pracht had been speeding when he ran into the 
back of Tripp's truck - Detective Roberts conceded that Pracht may have been going 
ninety miles an hour (R. 525: 373, R. 532: 32-35). From Pracht's skid marks, it appeared 
that he had braked improperly, in a manner known to cause the sliding which preceded 
his collision with Tripp's truck (R. 532: 17, 37). It appeared from the evidence at the 
scene that had he not done this, there was ample room for him to steer around Tripp's 
truck in the intersection or to stop before colliding with the truck (R. 532: 37, 58-59). 
See also Point II of Tripp's opening brief (confirming that even with the full accident 
reconstruction, there was substantial doubt as to who caused the accident). 
The State's recognition that State v. Larsen. 2000 UT App. 106, 999 P.2d 1252, 
requires more than mere inadvertence, State's brief at 22, needs to go further to recognize 
what Larsen requires and what the police in Tripp's case lacked - proof or probable cause 
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that Tripp's negligence was the cause of death. See id. at <fl 20. 
The State claims that Detective Roberts had probable cause to believe that Tripp 
was driving while intoxicated because she was shaking, nervous, smoking continuously, 
had red eyes, and appeared to lack concern for Prachet. State's brief at 22-24. The 
argument does not account for Detective Roberts' acknowledgment that shakiness and 
nervousness would be normal for someone involved in a fatal car accident (R. 533: 27), 
the testimony of the State's own witnesses that Tripp was very upset by the accident and 
continued crying up to and throughout the blood draw (R. 532: 44, 48, R. 533: 67, 77, 
82), that her red eyes were caused by her crying (R. 533: 70, 77), and that Tripp was 
smoking that night in an effort to calm herself (R. 533: 77). 
In assessing the State's argument, this Court should read the recent decision in 
State v. Worwood. 2007 UT 47, 164 P.3d 397. The court first found that an officer had 
reasonable suspicion of DUI, based on witnessing a large water spot on the road, a 
crushed beer can, a cooler, and the defendant smelling of alcohol behind the wheel of his 
truck. Id. at J^ 26. After finding that the detention went to far and constituted a de facto 
arrest because the officer transported Worwood from his car to the officer's home for 
another officer to conduct field sobriety tests, Tflj 27-33, the Worwood court found that a 
suspect's odor of alcohol, slurred speech and bloodshot eyes did not give rise to probable 
cause for the de facto arrest for DUI, given the absence of unsteady walking. Id. at ^ 35 
and 36. In contrast, in Tripp's case, there was no indication that Tripp had consumed any 
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alcohol or other substance to establish a reasonable suspicion to detain. The trial court's 
finding of fact number 7 encompasses the facts which refute the State's probable cause to 
arrest theory, stating: "No officer detected the odor of alcohol on the defendant, nor did 
they observe any obvious signs of impairment, such as poor balance or slurred speech." 
(R. 158). See also R. 525: 350, 377 (Officer Saunders conceded that he had no 
reasonable suspicion that Tripp was impaired or intoxicated, and testified that he sought a 
blood draw because the accident was serious, and he routinely seeks blood draws in such 
cases and believed he could make the demand). 
Because there was no probable cause to justify Tripp's arrest, suppression of 
resultant evidence is required. See Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471, 484-488 
(1963) (Fourth Amendment violations require suppression); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 
460, 465-71 (Utah l990)(plurality)(Avticlc I §14 violations require suppression).2 
2While Larocco is a plurality opinion, it is routinely applied as governing law in 
this state. See State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415, 416-20 (Utah 1991) (majority of the 
Court recognized privacy interest in bank records under Article I § 14, held in accordance 
with Larocco that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a violation of Article I § 14, 
and that no exceptions had been recognized to the Utah exclusionary rule); State v. 
DeBooy, 996 P.2d 546, 554 (Utah 2000) (finding exclusion of illegal checkpoint stop to 
be a necessary consequence of Article I § 14); State v. Ziegelman, 905 P.2d 883, 887 
(Utah App. 1995) (finding that violation of Fourth Amendment during traffic stop 
required suppression under Larocco). 
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D. THE UNLAWFUL ARREST TAINTED THE 
PURPORTED CONSENT. 
The State concedes that the proximity between Tripp's arrest and the blood draw 
weighs in favor of suppression. State's brief at 26. The State contends that suppression 
is nonetheless inappropriate, because the police arrested Tripp in order to comply with the 
Fourth Amendment by obtaining a warrant. State's brief at 26-27. While the officers did 
threaten Tripp that they would get a warrant, there is no evidence in the record 
whatsoever that they ever took any steps to do so. Nor would there be, given that they 
believed they did not need a warrant and could forcibly take her blood, given the 
seriousness of the accident (R. 525: 10, 25, R. 532: 23, R. 533: 33-34). 
The State contends that the blood tech's paraphrasing of the DUI admonition, 
regarding her civil entitlement to a driver's license and telling Tripp that she had rights to 
silence and counsel and had to make her own decision (R. 533: 93, 110), dissipates the 
taint of the unlawful arrest. State's brief at 27. This discussion, coming from the blood 
tech, undoubtedly rang rather hollow to Tripp, given that the discussion occurred after the 
police informed Tripp that she was in custody, not free to leave, and under arrest (R. 532: 
27; R. 533: 16, 31-32, 73), and that the discussion followed the police demand that she 
take the test in addition to telling her that she could not refuse to submit to the blood 
draw, and that the police would get a warrant and take her blood by force (R. 532: 23-27, 
R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72). Particularly where the blood was drawn when Tripp was 
physically surrounded and restrained by the police and their agents, after the blood tech 
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tricked her into surrendering her arm on the pretense that he would only check to see if 
there were a suitable vein (R. 533: 95), his admonition to her did not attenuate the blood 
draw from the preceding illegalities, but rather, aggravated them. The facts in the record 
establish that any purported consent by Tripp was tainted by and part of the ongoing 
violations of Tripp's constitutional privacy rights. See, e.g.. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 
590,603-04(1975). 
E. THE STATE'S INEVITABLE DISCOVERY 
ARGUMENT WAS WAIVED BELOW AND 
IS INCORRECT ON THE MERITS. 
On appeal, the State argues that regardless of the legality of Tripp's arrest, the 
blood draw is exempt from the exclusionary rule by the inevitable discovery doctrine. 
State's brief at 28-30. The inevitable discovery doctrine shields from the exclusionary 
rule that illegally seized evidence which inevitably would have been discovered through 
independent, lawful means. See, e ^ , Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984); United 
States v. Souza. 223 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000). To avail itself of the benefits of 
the exception, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that illegally 
obtained evidence would inevitably have been discovered. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5; 
Souza, 223 F.3d at 1203. The State must show an ongoing lawful investigation whereby 
the evidence would have been lawfully obtained, or must show other compelling facts 
showing that a lawful investigation would have resulted in the discovery of the 
10 
information. State v. Topanotes. 3002 UT 30 ! 15, 76 P.3d 1159. "For courts confidently 
to predict what would have occurred, but did not actually occur, there must be persuasive 
evidence of events or circumstances apart from those resulting in illegal police activity 
that would have inevitably led to discovery." State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at j^ 16, 76 
P.3d 1159. 
The most fundamental problem with the inevitable discovery argument is that no 
warrant would have issued on the facts of this case, which did not give rise to probable 
cause that Tripp had anything in her system to be found by the execution of a warrant. 
Warrants are only to issue after neutral and detached magistrates find that there is nexus, 
or probable cause to believe that the places the warrants authorize the police to search 
actually contain the items to be seized. Rg,, State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, ^  11 104 
P.3d 1265. As is detailed fully in Point III of this brief, supra, at the time of the 
investigation, the police did not have probable cause to believe that Tripp had committed 
any offense or was under the influence of any substance, let alone to an unlawful degree. 
See id. See also Point II of Tripp's opening brief (detailing the evidence indicating that 
even after full accident reconstruction, the evidence indicated that Pracht may have been 
the cause of the accident). Assuming arguendo that Officer Roberts would have talked to 
Cecelia Budd or to another officer who had listened to Budd prior to seeking a warrant, 
her having detected an odor of alcohol emanating from the car Tripp was sitting in with 
her friends and family prior to her arrest (R. 525: 221, 224, R. 533: 76, 78, 86-87) did not 
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give rise to probable cause to believe that the smell emanated from Tripp to justify the 
issuance of the warrant. See Saddler, supra. Because the facts of Tripp's case did not 
give rise to probable cause, see, e j^ , Worwood, supra, the State cannot establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the blood test would have been obtained by a warrant. 
See, Saddler, supra. 
The trial court did not adopt the State's position below that the preponderance of 
the evidence showed that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered. Compare 
R. 95-97 (State's memorandum, arguing inevitable discovery) with R. 157-160 (trial court 
ruling that the evidence was obtained by consent). The only evidence pertaining to a 
potential warrant search came through Officer Roberts, who did not believe that a warrant 
was required (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72). While he testified that he thought it 
would take a couple of hours to get a warrant (R. 533: 18), there is no evidence that he 
made any effort to do so or that he would have if the blood tech and his other agents had 
not taken Tripp's blood by trickery and force. 
F. THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY. 
In order to justify a warrantless search on the theory of exigent circumstances, the 
State must normally establish both probable cause that evidence of intoxication would be 
found and exigent circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, ^ f 24, 156 
P.3d 771. Because the search at issue encroached on the "dignity and integrity" of 
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Tripp's body, wherein she should have enjoyed the highest expectation of privacy, id, the 
State should have demonstrated a "clear indication" that evidence of a crime would be 
found, which is a more rigorous showing than probable cause. Id. As is detailed above, 
there was no probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion that Tripp was under the 
influence of any substance, let alone an illegal one or to an illegal degree. See Point III, 
supra. These same facts establish that there was no proof of a clear indication that 
evidence would be found. 
The State relies on Officer Roberts' observations of Tripp - that she was shaking, 
nervous, smoking continuously, had red eyes, and appeared to lack concern for Prachet. 
State's brief at 22-24, 31. The argument does not account for Detective Roberts' 
acknowledgment that shakiness and nervousness would be normal for someone involved 
in a fatal car accident (R. 533: 27), the testimony of the State's own witnesses that Tripp 
was very upset by the accident and continued crying up to and throughout the blood draw 
(R. 532: 44, 48, R. 533: 67, 77, 82), that her red eyes were caused by her crying (R. 533: 
70, 77), and that Tripp was smoking that night in an effort to calm herself (R. 533: 77). 
The State claims that Cecelia Budd smelled alcohol emanating from Tripp, State's brief at 
31, apparently misreading her actual testimony that she thought the odor of alcohol in the 
family car came from Tripp (R. 525: 221, 224, R. 533: 76, 78, 86-87). The final piece of 
the State's argument, that probable cause was established because Tripp failed to yield the 
right of way to Pracht, State's brief at 31, does not account for the testimony from the 
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police that Pracht's motorcycle ran into and slid underneath Pracht's motorcycle slid 
underneath and into the rear end of her truck (R. 525: 346). The State likewise fails 
account for police testimony that they did not know if Pracht caused the accident and that 
at the time of the arrest and blood draw, the police did not know if Pracht had been 
speeding when he ran into the back of Tripp's truck - Detective Roberts conceded that 
Pracht may have been going ninety miles an hour (R. 525: 373, R. 532: 32-35). From 
Pracht's skid marks, it appeared that he had braked improperly, in a manner known to 
cause the sliding which preceded his collision with Tripp's truck (R. 532: 17, 37). It 
appeared from the evidence at the scene that had he not done this, there was ample room 
for him to steer around Tripp's truck in the intersection or to stop before colliding with 
the truck (R. 532: 37, 58-59). These facts and others detailed in Point II of Tripp's 
opening brief, indicating that Pracht may have caused the accident rather than Tripp 
further counsel against a finding that the State proved a clear indication that evidence of a 
crime would be found through the warrantless search of Tripp's blood. See, e.g., 
Worwood, supra (finding a lack of probable cause, a lesser showing than is required here, 
in a case with more facts pointing to evidence of a crime). 
The State claims the warrantless blood draw was required because Roberts 
testified that it would take him a couple of hours to get a warrant, because he would have 
to talk to his fellow officers, screen it with a district attorney, and get a judge's signature. 
State's brief at 32 (R. 533: 18-19). This testimony failed to address most of the factors 
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which bear on the analysis of whether the State has met its burden to establish exigent 
circumstances. See State v. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384, 1392 (Utah 1994) (listing the 
following factors: "the distance to the nearest magistrate, the availability of a telephonic 
warrant, the feasibility of a stake-out or other form of surveillance while a warrant is being 
obtained, the seriousness of the underlying alcohol-related offense, the commission of another 
offense such as fleeing the scene, the ongoing and continuing nature of an investigation, 
the extent of probable cause, and the conduct of the investigating officers."). As the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized in State v. Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, 156 P.3d 771, technology 
and the law are constantly advancing the speed with which the police may obtain 
telephonic or other remotely communicated warrants, without the assistance of a district 
attorney, and in very little time. See id. at fflf 37-46. See also Ut. R. Crim. P. 40 
(permitting the issuance of warrants without any participation by a district attorney or any 
attorney). 
To the extent that the State had a pressing need to test Tripp for alcohol because 
she had been involved in a fatal traffic accident, where Tripp's only objection was to a 
blood test by needles, the State could readily have tested for alcohol with field sobriety 
tests, a portable breath test or an intoxilyzer. There was no pressing need, or exigency, 
for a blood test at all. 
The trial court did not adopt the State's position below that exigent circumstances 
justified the warrantless blood draw. Compare R. 88-95 (State's memorandum, arguing 
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exigent circumstances) with R. 157-160 (trial court's ruling, finding search was justified 
by consent). 
Because the State has failed to establish exigent circumstances or any other lawful 
justification for the warrantless blood draw, this Court should order suppression of the 
test results. See Wong Sun and Larocco, supra. Because the State does not attempt to 
establish that the admission of the blood test results was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and does not contest the prejudice attendant to their admission, the Court should 
reverse Tripp's convictions. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER A NEW TRIAL WITH 
LEGALLY CORRECT JURY INSTRUCTIONS. 
A. COUNSEL FOR TRIPP DID NOT WAIVE 
HER ENTITLEMENT TO LEGALLY 
CORRECT JURY INSTRUCTIONS. 
The State argues that counsel for Tripp waived and invited any errors in the jury 
instructions, and this Court is thereby precluded from addressing the errors. State's brief 
at 33-36. 
The preservation rule is designed to serve two policy interests - the interest in 
having trial judges efficiently correct errors at the first opportunity, and the interest in 
discouraging parties from planting error, or taking one tactical position at trial and then 
reversing position on appeal in the event the trial strategy failed. See State v. Bujan, 2006 
UT App 322,% 18, 2006 WL 2167205. The doctrine of invited error is designed to stop 
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parties from taking one strategically advantageous position at trial, and then reversing that 
position on appeal in the event that the first strategy failed at trial. See, e.g.. State v. 
Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989). 
In the instant matter, counsel for Tripp did not try to mislead the court into error 
because it may have been advantageous to do so at trial. Rather, he repeatedly and 
correctly informed the court that the instructions improperly informed the jury that 
Pracht's negligence could not be considered in the causation and negligence equations (R. 
526: 391; R. 527: 683-86). The objection was made in an effort to serve Tripp's interests 
at trial, and was not a position counsel could reverse on appeal, because the instructions 
forbade the jurors from considering Tripp's primary and legitimate defense at trial - that 
she was not guilty because Pracht was the proximate cause of the accident. 
The objections were discussed in chambers, at the bench, and in two discussions 
on the record (R. 526: 391; R. 527: 683-86).3 While the court did invite counsel for Tripp 
to submit a supplemental instruction, any instruction correctly stating the law would have 
been futile to submit, given the court's repeated rulings overruling defense objections that 
the court's instructions correctly stated the law in disallowing the jurors' consideration of 
Pracht's negligence in the causation and negligence inquiries (R. 526: 391; R. 527: 683-
3In choosing to discuss these important matters in unrecorded in-chambers and 
bench conferences in a felony homicide case, this court of record violated longstanding 
and well-established precedent from this Court. See State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934, 936 
n.3 (Utah App. 1990)(in courts of record, all proceedings, including bench conferences, 
must be recorded). 
17 
86). The fact that counsel had the courtesy to end the objection conference with his 
acknowledgment that he understood the court's position and with a "thank you" did 
exactly nothing to diminish his earlier arguments that the court's instructions improperly 
forbade the jury from considering Pracht's negligence in the causation and negligence 
inquiries, and thereby diminished the State's burden of proving its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt (R. 526: 391; R. 527: 683-86). Contrary to the State's brief, id. page 35, 
it was not defense counsel who informed the trial court that the court had accurately 
stated the defense position. Rather, it was the prosecutor, Ms. Johnson, who agreed that 
the Court had correctly stated the State's position (R. 527: 686, lines 12-14). 
Because the trial court had multiple opportunities to consider Tripp's objections 
and because defense counsel did not seek or approve of any instruction given by the 
court, any error was not waived or invited, and this Court has full authority to address the 
merits of the issue. Compare, e.g.. Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ^ 19, 164 P.3d 366 
(invited error doctrine precludes review of jury instructions when defense counsel 
affirmatively approves jury instructions). 
B. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE 
INCORRECT AND PREJUDICIAL. 
On the merits, the State never quotes, defends or even acknowledges the jury 
instruction challenged on appeal, Instruction No. 30, which informed the jurors: 
A victim's negligence, if it exists, can be considered to be a 
18 
concurrent cause and not a superseding one. Therefore, even if a victim 
were negligent, such a fact would not insulate the defendant from criminal 
culpability. 
(R. 336). See State's brief at 37-41. The state does not dispute that two other instructions 
informed the jurors that evidence of a contributing cause would not absolve Tripp of 
responsibility (R. 335, 340). See State's brief at 37-41. Nor does the State contest the 
law presuming that the jurors followed these instructions. See id. Accordingly, this 
Court should adopt the positions asserted in Tripp's opening brief because they are 
undisputed and correct. 
The State argues that Tripp was not entitled to jury instructions on superseding 
cause, because the evidence did not support them. With regard to Tripp's claim that 
Pracht's speeding caused the accident, the State argues that the only credible evidence 
indicated that he was not speeding. State's brief at 38. The State's summary of the 
evidence does not acknowledge its own expert's agreement that if Pracht had been going 
the speed limit, Tripp would have cleared the intersection without him hitting her (R. 526: 
516). Credibility determinations are for juries to make in any event. In the instant matter, 
Tripp's jurors may well have believed that Pracht was speeding had jury instruction 36 
not effectively forbidden them from considering the legal effect of that factual 
determination.4 
4As the trial court recognized, the State's evidence conflicted regarding whether he 
should have been driving fifty or sixty miles an hour (T. 526: 563, 696, R; 527: 705, 
State's Exhibit 30). Tripp had the right to assume that Pracht was going the speed limit 
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The State claims that Tripp cites only to the preliminary hearing, and had no 
evidence at trial to support the argument that Pracht's improper braking may have caused 
the accident. State's brief at 38 and n.9. While there was testimony at the preliminary 
hearing indicating that had Pracht been braking properly, he could have stopped or 
steered around Tripp's truck, rather than sliding underneath and colliding with it as he did 
(R. 532: 37-39). At trial the evidence also demonstrated the same facts. The point of 
impact between his motorcycle and the rear end of Tripp's truck appeared to be within 
three feet of either side of the center line on U-l 11, the road Pracht was driving on at the 
time of the crash (R. 526: 509). The physical evidence showed that prior to the collision, 
Pracht was applying only his rear brake (R. 526: 475), and that he skidded for some forty-
four feet prior to sliding underneath and hitting Tripp's truck (R. 525: 355-56, 358, R. 
526: 465). Applying only the rear brake on a motorcycle routinely causes them to lose 
control and slide (R. 526: 410, 415). These facts presented at trial, like the preliminary 
hearing testimony, provided the factual basis for acquittal, had the jurors not been 
instructed that they could not consider Pracht's negligence as a superceding or 
intervening cause (R. 336). 
(R. 533: 60-61). The State's accident reconstructionist conceded that, due to a lack of 
underlying data from the police investigation, he would not purchase stock if his decision 
were based on information of the same quality as he had to work with in Tripp's case (R. 
526: 516). Nonetheless, he estimated that Pracht was driving at least 59 miles an hour, 
and may have been going faster than that (R. 526: 505, 514). He testified that if Pracht 
had been going fifty miles an hour, Tripp would have cleared the intersection before 
Pracht came through, and that there would have been no accident (R. 526: 516). 
20 
The Utah cases upon which the State relies do not support the jury instructions 
given by the trial court. See State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1216 (Utah 1993) (to 
constitute an intervening or superseding cause, a third party's conduct must be 
unforeseeable and may not be a result of the defendant's actions); State v. Hamblim 676 
P.2d 375, 377 and 379 (Utah 1983) (defendant's driving well over the speed limit and too fast 
for conditions caused him to hit the victim, whose BAC was .10; thus no superseding intervening 
cause jury instruction was warranted); and State v. Hallett, 619P.2d335,338 (Utah 
1980)(rejecting claim that victim's speeding caused the accident, because proof of victim's 
speeding was not conclusive and it was reasonable to assume that victim would have stopped at 
stop sign had the defendant not bent it over). 
The cases from other jurisdictions likewise do not support the instruction given by the 
trial court, and/or are factually distinguishable and unpersuasive); State v., Munoz, 659 A.2d 683, 
692 (Conn. 1995)(requiring intervening efficient cause to be unforeseeable and so effective as to 
absolve the defendant of causal responsibility); State v. Ynocenscio, 773 So.2d 613, 615 (Fla. 
App. 2000) (defendant was properly convicted of vehicular homicide when he moved into 
opposing lane of traffic to pass another car when it was foggy because it was foreseeable that 
another driver might be coming in the opposing lane of traffic and speeding); State v. Lawson, 
913 A.2d 494, 500 (Conn. App. 2007)(defendant, who turned left in front of an oncoming 
motorcycle without signaling and while driving drunk was the cause of the accident, regardless of 
whether the motorcyclist was speeding and skidding). 
The State argues that the error was harmless because counsel for Tripp argued the 
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facts to the jury which were consistent with her theory that Pracht's speeding and braking 
errors and failure to wear a helmet caused his death. State's brief at 42-43. Tripp's jurors 
were required to follow the Court's instructions (R. 310), and it is legally presumed that 
they did so. See, e ^ , State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 272 (Utah 1988). Because the 
jurors were instructed that they could not consider Pracht's driving as the superseding 
cause of the accident (R. 336, 335, 340), when it appears that it well may have been the 
actual cause, the instructions did in fact diminish the State's burden of proof on the 
causation issue, as counsel argued in objecting to those instructions. Because Tripp was 
prejudiced by the erroneous jury instructions, this Court should reverse Tripp's 
convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should order a new trial wherein the blood test results are excluded and 
the jurors are instructed correctly. 
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